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Contracting under asymmetric 
holding cost information in a 
serial supply chain with a 
nearly profit maximizing buyer 
Guido Voigt1 
Abstract:  Screening contracts (or non-linear “menu of contracts”) are frequently used for aligning 
the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply 
chain parties are strictly (expected) profit maximizing and, therefore, sensible to even arbitrarily 
small pay-off differences between contract alternatives. However, previous behavioral work on 
contracting under asymmetric information in supply chains shows that agents (buyers) are not 
always strictly profit maximizing. Instead, they sometimes tend to choose contracts that have only a 
minor impact on their own performance but a substantially negative impact on the principal’s 
(supplier’s) and the overall supply chain’s performance. Thus, these studies indicate that the buyers 
are in fact not strictly but only nearly profit maximizing when making their contract choices. The 
present work relaxes the assumption of the strictly profit maximizing buyer in a serial supply chain 
for a lotsizing framework with asymmetrically distributed holding cost information and deterministic 
end-customer demand. The study provides researchers and managers an approach on how to 
account for the buyer’s insensitivity to arbitrarily small pay-off differences while providing a solution 
method for the resulting non-linear mathematical program. A numerical study compares the 
advantages of the “behavioral robust” contract assuming only nearly profit maximizing buyers 
against the classical screening contract assuming strictly profit maximizing buyers. The results 
highlight that supply chain performance losses can be substantially reduced under the behavioral 
robust contract. 
Keywords: Asymmetric information · Supply chain coordination · Contracting · Behavioral modeling  
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1. Introduction 
A major challenge of supply chain coordination is to align the incentives of the supply chain 
parties such that decentralized decision making leads to an overall supply chain efficient outcome 
(see, e.g., Cachon, 2003). Yet, if the incentives are not sufficiently aligned, then the supply chain 
members might deliberately exploit the supply chain counterpart to enhance own financial ratios. In 
this situation, the implementation of specific concepts like, e.g., just-in-time delivery is likely to fail 
unless there are mechanisms avoiding the pitfalls of opportunistic behavior in advance. Very 
prominent tools in the supply chain management literature for avoiding opportunistic behavior are 
contracts that legally stipulate the business relation between the supply chain parties. These 
contracts strive for linking the actions of the company to individual performance measures, e.g., 
costs or revenues to the overall supply chain performance. In other words, contracts try to align the 
incentives such that optimizing the individual performance is in line with optimizing the supply chain 
performance. In this context, the information availability within the supply chain becomes 
particularly important, since opportunistic behavior might translate to deception and mistrust and, 
thus, to an overall deterioration of supply chain performance. The purpose of the underlying paper is 
to investigate how contract design under asymmetric information can contribute to supply chain 
coordination when relatively small incentives are insufficient for aligning the actions of the supply 
chain parties.  
 We use a stylized supply chain interaction model as presented by Inderfurth et al. (2012) and 
Voigt and Inderfurth (2011 a/b) in order to analyze the impact of small pay-off differences on the 
supply chain performance. The model captures the basic supply chain conflict that suppliers typically 
prefer larger delivery lot-sizes in order to exploit economies of scale, while buyers tend to choose 
smaller delivery lots in order to have lower average inventories. We capture this situation with a lot-
sizing decision in a serial supply chain facing deterministic end-customer demand. In this context, 
information asymmetry arises because the supplier (principal) cannot fully assess the buyer’s 
(agent’s) advantages of lowering the average inventories, i.e., the buyer’s type (e.g., low cost type or 
high cost type) is unknown to the supplier. If the supplier strives for increasing the buyer’s order sizes 
he has to compensate the buyer, whereas the exact amount of the required compensation is 
unknown due to information asymmetry.2  
                                                          
2 We refer to economic lotsizing models under asymmetric information that are in nature similar 
to the stylized strategic lotsizing model presented in the underlying work to Corbett and de Groote 
(1997, 2000), Corbett (2001), Burnetas et al. (2007) and Sucky (2004, 2007).    
 3 Voigt: Contracting under asymmetric information for nearly profit maximizing buyers
If both parties are acting fully rational and strictly profit maximizing, it can be shown that the 
supply chain optimal outcome cannot be achieved since the expected profit maximizing supplier 
offers an inefficient non-linear contract scheme. This non-linear contract scheme (so-called 
“Screening Contract” or “Menu-of-Contract”) coordinates the supply chain to the second-best 
outcome, i.e., the best outcome achievable if decentralized decision makers are fully rational and 
strictly profit maximizing (see, e.g, Corbett and de Groote (2000), Corbett (2001), Sucky (2006), Ha 
(2001), Voigt and Inderfurth (2011a/b) and, for a comprehensive literature review, Voigt (2011)).  
While the screening theory is pretty much developed and established in the supply chain 
management literature (and other related areas) for fully rational and strictly profit maximizing 
supply chain parties, there are only a few contributions that analyze the supply chain behavior if 
these critical assumptions are not met.  As an example, full rationality in the present context requires 
that the less informed supply chain party (principal) reckons that all communication is only cheap 
talk, since the privately informed supply chain party (agent) will use the private information 
strategically and, therefore, biases the shared information in order to obtain more favorable contract 
terms. Since the principal anticipates this behavior, all communication will be disregarded and the 
supply chain ends-up in a babbling-equilibrium in which communication has no impact at all on the 
supply chain outcome. A relaxation of the assumption that communication has no impact in this 
context is presented by Voigt and Inderfurth (2011b). In contrast, the present article addresses the 
critical assumption of strictly profit maximizing buyers.  
The strict profit maximization assumption postulates that all supply chain parties always take the 
(expected) profit maximizing action. The principal maximizes his expected profits by offering a menu 
self-selection contracts that provides incentives to reveal the private information. This revelation of 
private information, in turn, is also strongly linked to the profit-maximization assumption, since 
revelation exploits the fact that there is a unique mapping between the private information and the 
profit maximizing contract. Since choosing the profit maximizing contract is assumed to be in the 
best interest of the agent, the revealing contract choice is frequently denoted as self-selection. One 
direct implication of the profit maximization assumption is that the agent is always (weakly) 
indifferent between two contract alternatives (i.e., two contracts out of the menu-of-contracts).3 
Due to the profit maximization assumption a distinct prediction on the contract choice is made, and 
the principal can theoretically infer the agent’s private information from his contract choice (i.e., 
information revelation). We denote the strictly profit-maximizing contract as the self-selection 
                                                          
3
Strictly indifferent means that there is no profit difference between to contract alternatives, whereas 
weakly indifferent means that an arbitrarily low incentive is given for choosing the self-selection contract.  
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contract and the next alternative to which the buyer is (weakly) indifferent as the indifference 
contract.   
A recent laboratory study by Inderfurth et al. (2012) shows that the strict profit-maximization 
assumption and, therefore, information revelation by self-selection is a critical assumption in the 
coordination literature under asymmetric information. In particular, their study shows that in 79% of 
all observations the profit maximizing contract was chosen. However, there is also a non-negligible 
fraction of contract choices (i.e., 21%) that cannot be explained by strict profit maximization. In 17% 
of the observations, the agents chose the nearly profit maximizing indifference contract. Thus, only 
4% of the contract choices cannot be explained by strict or near profit maximization, whereas 2% of 
these 4% can be attributed to a termination of the business relationship which might be interpreted 
as an attempt to signal bargaining power. Inderfurth et al. (2012) are showing that contract choices 
that are not strictly profit maximizing have a huge negative impact on the overall supply chain 
performance. The present work, therefore, presents a behavioral model that explicitly accounts for 
the fact that some agents might be insensitive to arbitrarily small pay-off differences between a self-
selection and an indifference contract and gives directions how the principal can deal with difficulties 
arising from this fact. Henceforth, we denote a contract that incorporates the buyer’s insensitivity to 
arbitrarily small pay-off differences as a behavioral robust contract, since such a contract 
incorporates the buyers’ behavior that is contrary to the standard assumption of strict profit 
maximization.  
One approach for incorporating insensitivity to small pay-off differences into screening models 
was introduced by Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 9.8.1), who are assuming that agents are 
making decision errors (so-called “trembling hand behavior”) that can be described by a probability 
distribution. The principal accounts for these decision errors by adding a slack into the incentive 
constraint in order to increase the likelihood that the agent chooses the self-selection contract. The 
principal is then computing the optimal menu of contract by taking into consideration the probability 
with which a contract is chosen instead of the a-priori probability of the distribution of types, where 
types denotes agents having different realizations with respect to the private information (e.g., low 
cost type or high cost type). The underlying work incorporates a similar approach, however, in 
contrast to Laffont and Martimort we are extending the analysis to more than two types and allow 
for a different formulation of the agents decision errors. While Laffont and Martimort assume that all 
agents make similar decision errors that are supported by a probability distribution following a 
monotone hazard rate, we are assuming that the agents are either acting strictly profit maximizing or 
only nearly profit maximizing (as identified by Inderfurth et al., 2012). In this context, near profit 
maximization means that the insensitivity to pay-off differences is limited by assumption such that 
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the buyer of a certain type will either choose the contract that was designed for his type or the 
indifference contract that was designed for the adjacent type. In particular, we are assuming that 
there is a linear dependency between the buyer’s pay-off difference of the two contract alternatives 
(i.e., self-selection and indifference contract) and the likelihood that the profit maximizing contract is 
chosen. The extended analysis specifically allows investigating the impact of bunching, i.e., several 
types are offered the same contract (pooling equilibrium) and the consequences for optimal contract 
design. To this end, we are presenting a numerical study highlighting the impact of decision errors 
(i.e., insensitivity to small pay-off differences) on the overall supply chain performance. Such a 
comparison has not been performed before but is especially important for the supply chain 
coordination point of view, since the second best outcome serves as a benchmark of the benefits of 
cooperation.  
Another approach accounting for the insensitivity to small pay-off differences is analyzed by 
Basov and Danilkina (2006) and by Basov (2009), who are analyzing the principal agent setting under 
the assumption that agents make probabilistic choices according to Luce (1959). In this setup, the 
likelihood of the contract choice depends, on the one side, on the number of contract alternatives 
offered and, on the other side, on the pay-off differences between those alternatives. In this 
approach, thus, the principal can increase the probability that the profit maximizing contract is 
chosen by offering several contracts that result in the same pay-off. This is done by introducing a new 
dimension to the product that has no impact on the agents utility associated with this product (e.g., 
agents have no preference for the “flavor” of a product like cereals). In contrast to this approach, we 
are not assuming a probabilistic choice rule in which every alternative is chosen with a positive 
probability. Instead, we are assuming that the actual pay-off difference between the alternatives is 
the only distinguishing criteria determining the probability with which contracts are chosen. Under 
the probabilistic choice assumption as analyzed by Basov and Danilkina (2006) and Basov (2009), the 
introduction of insensitivity to small pay-off differences does interestingly have no impact on the 
coordination deficit (i.e., gap between the sum off principals and agents pay-offs between first-best 
and second-best solution), while we are observing such an impact on the overall coordination deficit 
in our setting.  
Basov and Mirrless (2009) present a study in which the agent makes random decision errors that 
are type dependent instead of depending on the actual pay-off differences between the alternatives. 
They are showing that in such a context the principal may even be better off if he is anticipating such 
systematic decision errors. In our approach, however, we are assuming like Basov and Danilkina 
(2006) and Basov (2009) that the pay-off differences resulting from the informational rents suffices 
for ensuring (nearly) profit maximizing contract choices, i.e., either the self-selection or the (weakly) 
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indifference contract is chosen. This assumption is supported by the experimental study from 
Inderfurth et al. (2012)  who are showing that strictly or nearly profit maximizing contract choices are 
being made in 96% (strict profit maximization: 79%, near profit maximization: 17%) of all 
observations.  Thus, only 4% of all observations cannot be explained by (nearly) profit maximizing 
contract choices, which rather supports the assumption of nearly profit maximizing agents (as in 
Basov and Danilkina, 2006, and Basov, 2009) than agents making random decision errors 
independent of the pay-off structure (as in Basov and Mirrless, 2009).  
Incorporating observations from experimental work (e.g., other regarding preferences, decision 
biases, bounded rational behavior) into theoretical operation management models in order to 
increase the predictive power, practical applicability and external validity of the theoretical models 
received an increasing attention in the recent past (we refer to Loch and Wu (2007) for a discussion 
on how behavioral models can enrich the operations management research). Examples of such 
behaviorally enriched models include, e.g., Voigt and Inderfurth (2011b) who investigate a behavioral 
screening model in a supply chain setting that is closest to the underlying work. They are analyzing 
and quantifying the pitfalls of information sharing in an asymmetric information context by 
introducing the assumption that a fraction of privately informed supply chain parties report their 
private information truthfully regardless of the underlying incentives. Supply chain models 
incorporating objectives different from profit maximization have been analyzed by Cui et al. (2007) 
and Pavlov and Katok (2011). 
The contributions to the behavioral management literature and the screening literature are 
threefold. First, the study provides researchers and managers an approach on how to account for 
decision errors when offering screening contracts to agents that are insensitive to small pay-off 
differences in a framework where a buyer and a supplier are negotiating the terms of delivery in a 
just-in-time environment. It is shown that supply chain losses occurring from indifference contract 
choices can be substantially limited if the buyers are either actively incentivized to choose the self-
selection contract by increasing the pay-off difference and/or by adjusting the order sizes in the 
respective screening contract.  
Second, we are contributing to the operations research field of contract design by showing an 
efficient way for determining the contract parameters for a non-linear, non-concave optimization 
problem that is linearly constraint. We are showing that there are at most two critical points 
resulting from the evaluation of the respective Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and show that there is 
at most one interior solution that qualifies for the global optimum. We perform the analysis for the 
case of more than two types, which allows identifying specific characteristics of the screening 
contract that would not be observable otherwise. To this end, we are introducing an algorithm that 
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allows identifying the regions in which different buyer types will be offered the same contract (so-
called “bunching”). 
Third, a numerical study compares the performance of the contract that accounts for insensitivity 
to small pay-off differences to the a-priori screening contract. It is shown, that indifference contract 
choices result in the majority of the cases to supply chain performance losses. However, the losses 
resulting from indifference contract choices can be considerably limited if the contract accounts for 
this phenomenon. Interestingly, though, the analysis reveals that in some specific cases the supply 
chain performance even improves compared to the classical a-priori screening benchmark. 
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the stylized supply chain interaction 
model under full and asymmetric information. Section 3 summarizes the optimization procedure for 
the behavioral robust contract under asymmetric information. Section 4 introduces the measures 
against which the behavioral robust contract is benchmarked and Section 5 complements the 
numerical example with a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes and gives managerial insights. A 
detailed derivation of the optimal behavioral robust contract is given in the Appendix, Section 8.  
2. Outline of the model  
A strategic lotsizing model, as introduced by Voigt and Inderfurth (2011 a, b) and Voigt (2011), is 
used to elaborate and quantify the impact of insensitivity to small pay-off differences in screening 
contracts. The model depicts a dyadic supply chain interaction in which the buyer (B) faces a 
deterministic and constant end-customer demand, d . The products are sold at a fixed price to the 
end-customer, i.e., the impact of ordering decisions on the buyer-customer interface is not 
considered in the underlying model.  
The buyer’s inventory-related costs are assumed to be linearly proportional to the stock level, 
which is dependent on the actual ordering decision, q . The aggregated holding cost parameter, h , is 
an aggregated measure for the entire buyer’s disadvantages he faces if he orders in large quantities, 
e.g., more required warehouse space and handling equipment/workforce, more tied-up capital, etc. 
In turn, the supplier faces several drawbacks if he allows for low order sizes, e.g., losses of economies 
of scale in various logistics activities. These disadvantages are depicted by the fixed costs occurring 
per order, f. Hence, if the supplier agrees upon low order sizes, he will occur those fixed costs on 
average more frequently per period. All other cost effects are excluded in the underlying model in 
order to facilitate the exposition on the behavioral observations mentioned earlier.  The buyer’s 
decision variable is the order size, while lower order sizes are associated with less costs, i.e., given an 
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order size of q, the buyer faces holding costs of  / 2h q  per period. The supplier, in turn, favors 
higher order sizes in order to leverage economies of scale. His fixed costs per period amount to
  /f d q . The profit allocation in the supply chain takes place via the transfer-price per unit, w. 
Thus, total transfers per period amount to w d . The buyer may choose an alternative supplier, if 
the costs of this supply source, R , are cheaper than the costs resulting under any contract offered 
from the supplier. In this case, the supplier is assumed earning SP per unit demand (e.g., by trading 
with another buyer).  In the present study we are assuming that the supplier will not exclude any 
buyer type from trade, i.e., trade is even profitable for the high cost buyer. For a discussion of so-
called cut-off policies where buyer types may be excluded from trade it is referred to Ha (2001) and 
Cakanyildirim et al. (2012). All in all, the above situation captures the well-known supply chain 
conflict that supplier’s tend to favor larger lot-sizes, while buyer’s prefer to source in smaller lots 
(see, e.g., Corbett and de Groote, 2000).  
We are assuming that the buyer is with a probability   sensitive to even arbitrarily small pay-off 
differences as assumed in the classical screening literature. However, with probability  1  the 
buyer is insensitive to arbitrarily small pay-off differences and the magnitude of the insensitivity to 
pay-off difference cannot be assessed with certainty by the principal. Instead, he assumes upper and 
lower bounds ( lt and ht ), i.e., the pay-off difference must be at least lt  for being tangible for the 
buyer, and is with certainty sufficient for a pay-off difference of .ht .  Given a pay-off difference 
, l ht t t t  , we are assuming that the buyer will choose the profit maximizing contract with 
probability ( )t , where 0 ( ) 1t  and ( )t depends linearly on t , i.e., ( ) 0t t  	 and 
2 2( ) 0t t  
 . Thus, the higher the pay-off difference, the higher the probability that the buyer 
chooses the profit-maximizing contract and vice versa. Note that we are restricting ourselves to a 
linear shape of ( )t in order to be able to prove the optimality of our resulting behavioral robust 
contract. In principle, though, other functional forms may be assumed and integrated into the 
presented framework. However, in this case the number of local maximas may be indefinite and 
other optimization approaches in the field of non-linear optimization or heuristic methods may be 
applied. Nonetheless, the general insights presented in this work will not change from a qualitative 
point of view, since even only locally optimal solutions (that are, for example, obtained by applying 
simple local search procedures) will limit the effect of out-of-equilibrium contract choices. 
Under full information (FI) of all above mentioned parameters, it is in the supplier’s best interest 
to offer a contract that maximizes his own profits, while ensuring that the buyer does not choose the 
alternative supply source which causes costs of R. The supplier’s optimal contract offer consists of a 
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combination of wholesale price and order quantity, ,FIA w q
 , that is determined by 
solving:Formel-Kapitel 2 Abschnitt 2 
    , ,max ( ) 1 ( )
. .
w q t S S
fP t d w t d Pq
s t
 
       
 (2.1) 
   2hw t d q R d       (2.2) 
 l ht t t   (2.3) 
The participation constraint (2.2) will bind in the optimal solution, and it follows directly that  
 
2
hw R q t
d

   

 (2.4) 
Note, that t in (2.2) can be interpreted as a fictional discount on the wholesale-pricew . Since the 
participation constraint (2.2) must be binding in the optimal solution, the slack-variable t ensures 
that the buyer in fact has a total cost advantage when accepting the contract instead of choosing the 
alternative supplier of 
2
ht d R d q w d 
       per period between both alternatives (i.e., outside 
option and contract offer). Inserting (2.4) into (2.1) and deriving and solving for q gives the optimal 
order size  
 
2FI f dq
h
 

  (2.5) 
The optimal size of the pay-off difference can be calculated from solving:  
 
( )
( ) 0
2
S l h
t h fR t q P t t t t
t d q
 
 
       
      
 (2.6) 
As highlighted earlier, the holding costs are assumed to be multidimensional since they are an 
aggregate measure for the non-value adding disadvantages of holding inventories. We model this 
situation by the common approach that there is a probability distribution, , 1,...,ip i n
 , over 
possible holding cost realizations , 1,...,ih i n
 and 1 ... ...i nh h h    . The corresponding supply 
chain optimal contract as if under full information is donated as , 1,...,FIiq i n 
 .  
This formulation is denoted as the discrete-type case, in which we distinguish between the buyer 
types ih . An alternative formulation is the continuous-type case (see, e.g., Corbett, 2001), in which 
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there is a continuum of types ,h h    with support of a density function. We refer to Kerschbamer 
and Maderner (1998) for a discussion and comparison of the respective model formulations. 
In the standard game-theoretic equilibrium, the supplier offers a menu of contracts 
, , 1,...,i i iA w q i n
 
 , in which the contract iA  minimizes the buyers costs for holding cost ih  
(incentive constraint). Again, we assume that a buyer type ih  with a pay-off difference of it will 
choose the profit maximizing contract offer with probability ( )it . For notational convenience we 
introduce ( )i it 
 . 
 
 
, , 11
1
max ( ) 1
1
. .
i i i
n
w q t S i i i i ii
i i
n n S
f fE P p d w w
q q
p P d
s t
 




    

           
    
    

 (2.7) 
   1 1, 1,..., 1
2 2
i i
i i i i i
h hw t d q w d q i n        
   (2.8) 
  
2
n
n n n
hw t d q R d      (2.9) 
 
1 1,..., 1i iq q i n   
   (2.10) 
 1,...,l i ht t t i n   
  (2.11) 
The above formulated approach is already a reduced form of the classical optimization problem 
which already takes into account some properties that must hold in the optimal menu of contracts. 
Therefore, some constraints that will not bind in the optimal solution can be eliminated (see 
Sappington, 1983). These properties are: (1) 
1
AI AI
i iq q 	  and 1 1,...,
AI AI
i iw w i n   
 , (2) the 
participation constraint for the buyer facing holding costs nh  binds (i.e., the buyer is weakly 
indifferent between choosing contract An or choosing the alternative supplier), and (3) the buyer 
facing holding costs ( 1,..., 1)
 ih i n  is (weakly) indifferent between the contracts iA and 1iA  , 
1,..., 1i n 
  .  
Property (1) states that the wholesale price decreases with increasing order sizes. Hence, the 
menu of contracts can be interpreted as a quantity discount. Properties (2) and (3) point out that a 
buyer is always indifferent between at least two alternatives. However, in our approach we introduce 
the slack variable ,i l i ht t t t   ensuring in the optimization program formulation that the 
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indifference property holds. However, it  will not be included in the resulting contract offers 
,i i iA w q
 , but will only be a fictional number controlling for the pay-off difference that will result 
between the contract offers. As mentioned earlier, we are assuming that the buyer will choose with 
probability i  the profit maximizing contract iA and with probability  1 i  the next contract 
alternative 1iA   resulting in a loss of it . As in Laffont and Martimort (2002), Basov and Danilkina 
(2006), and Basov (2009), we are applying the concept of nearly rational profit-maximizing buyers 
(agents). In this context, nearly profit maximizing means that the upper bound ht  is sufficiently low 
for ensuring that the buyer will only either choose the self-selection or the indifference contract, i.e. (
1,i iA A  ), and not any other contract,  , , 1jA j i i  , out of the menu of contracts.  
3. Optimal contract parameters under asymmetric 
information 
In the classical formulation of this problem, i.e., 1i 
  and 0it 
 1,...,i n 
 , the objective 
function is concave and there is therefore only one critical point qualifying for an interior optimal 
solution. However, by introducing i  the objective function loses its concavity condition. Yet, we can 
show that there are at most one local minimum and one local maximum and the optimal contract 
parameters can therefore be efficiently obtained by determining the local maximum out of the two 
critical points resulting from evaluating the KKT conditions. Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
Setting up the Lagrange function gives: 
 
   
    
 
1
11 1
1
1
, 1 1 11
1
1
2
max 1
1
2 2
( )
2
n n
i i i i i ii i
i i
n i i
Sn n i i i i i i ii
nn
n n n i l i i i hi
n
ij j ii j i
f fp w d p w d
q q
h hp P d w t d q w d q
hw t d q R d t t t t
q q
 
 
  
 


 



  





 !
   

             
   
             
 
             
 
 
 


 

 (3.1) 
The Lagrange parameter ij  in (3.1) is related to the implementability condition (2.10).  For 
certain parameter combinations, the solution to the relaxed problem which neglects the 
implementability condition (2.10) gives 1i iq q  . However, such a solution cannot be optimal, since 
it does not satisfy all incentive constraints (see for a discussion, e.g., Sappington, 1983). In the 
majority of the contributions regarding screening contracts in the literature, this case is ruled out by 
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imposing restrictions on the agent’s utility function (here: buyer’s cost function) and/or the a-priori 
probability distribution , 1,...,ip i n
 .
4 If such conditions are satisfied, then the relaxed problem 
without the implementability condition will always yield the supply chain optimum in the classical 
screening model. However, in the present model formulation, bunching occurs even in situations 
that would not be expected in the classical screening model. Hence, imposing restrictions on the a-
priori distribution and the buyer’s cost function alone cannot rule out bunching, because the actual 
frequency of contract choices is not only determined by the a-priori distribution but also by the 
buyer’s insensitivity to pay-off differences. Hence, we explicitly consider this situation and provide an 
algorithm that may be used to determine the optimal contract parameters for those situations in 
which the implementability condition (2.10) binds. We refer to the Appendix, Section 8 for a detailed 
derivation of the optimal menu of contracts.  
The optimal contracts Ai=<qi,wi> in the menu of contracts result from (see): 
  | , 1,...., 1,...,i zj zjq q for i j z z z j and q M i n
 " 	  "  
  (3.2) 
where zjq  and M
 are determined according to the algorithm mentioned below.  
The optimal wholesale prices are: 
  1 1 1,..., 1
2
i
i i i i i
hw w t q q i n
d 

     
   (3.3) 
 .
2
n
n n n
hw R t q
d

     (3.4) 
The optimal pay-off difference, it , results from solving the following non-linear equation system.  
  11 1
1
0 1,...,
ii
i i i k i ik
i i i
f fp w w p p i n
t q q
  


 
        
  
   
  (3.5) 
Note, the function (3.5) is uni-modular for a linear shape of i , i.e., there is at most one local 
minimum (see Appendix (8.29) - (8.31)). Thus, there are at most two solutions satisfying the KKT 
condition, whereby one yields a global minimum and the other the global maximum (as long as the 
maximum is an inner solution). Thus, for solving the non-linear equation system well established 
methods (e.g., Newton–Raphson method) can be used for determining the roots to (3.5).  
                                                          
4 In the continuous formulation of the principal-agent problem, e.g., bunching is ruled out by assuming a 
probability distribution that follows a monotone hazard rate. In contrast, in the discrete type case, bunching 
will never occur in the two-type case, or if the a-priori distribution and utility function satisfies certain 
conditions (see, Kerschbamer and Maderner, 1998). 
 13 Voigt: Contracting under asymmetric information for nearly profit maximizing buyers
The key for determining the optimal contract parameters (3.2) - (3.5) is to determine the order 
sizes that will be identical for different buyer types. Let zjq  denote the order sizes for which 
1 ...z z jq q q j z
 
 
  	  hold, i.e. for z j some buyer types will be offered an identical order 
size. Once we know the order sizes zjq , the optimal order sizes iq follow from (3.2). The optimal 
order sizes can be determined via the following algorithm.5 The general idea of the algorithm is to 
solve (3.2) to (3.5) without the implementability condition (2.10), and then to successively adding 
those constraints 1 ...z z jq q q	 	 	  that are not satisfied in the relaxed solution. 
From evaluating the KKT-conditions (see appendix, (8.23)) we get: 
 
 
 
  
2
1 1 11
1
1 1
2
1,...,
1
zj z
k z z j zk
j j
k z z j jk i
fdq i n and j i
p p h h
h
p p p

 

  


 


  
 	
   

   


 (3.6) 
Furthermore we define  
 
1,
, 1,...,
0,
zj
zj
if q M
x z j n and j z
else
# $"% %
  
 	& '
% %( )
.     (3.7) 
 
Start: 
   1 1,...,iix i n
  
  
   0ijx i j and j i
  * !  
   Solve (3.2) to (3.5) 1,...,iq i n+  
  
 
Do while Not 1 1,..., 1i iq q i n!  
   
, -1arg min | i iy i q q 
 
 
  
1z y
   
   Do while not y zq q!  
    
, 1 , 0
1
y z z z
yz
x x
x
 
 



    Solve (3.2) to (3.5) 1,...,iq i n+  
   
    1z z
   
   Loop 
 
Loop 
End 
                                                          
5 Methods for optimal bunching have been developed for the continuous type case (see, e.g., Nöldeke and 
Samuelson, 2007), however, to the best of our knowledge there have been no systematic approach being 
reported for the discrete type case.
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The algorithm is initialized with the relaxed problem (2.7) without implementability condition (2.10), 
i.e., the optimal contract parameters iq can be determined by setting z j
 which translates to the 
case that there is no bunching. If the implementability condition (2.10) is satisfied, then the optimal 
solution is found (since introducing additional constraints can only reduce the objective’s value). 
However, if the relaxed solution violates the implementability condition, then a so-called “bunching” 
occurs and some contracts out of the menu of contracts will be assigned the same order quantity. 
Therefore, it has to be determined which order sizes needs to be bunched. In every iteration, the 
problem needs to be solved according to (3.2) to (3.5), however, in each iteration the set of bunched 
contracts, M  , will be updated (expressed by changes of (3.7)). This is done within the two loops. 
The first loop ensures that all regions in which bunching might occur are identified, while the second 
loop identifies within each region how many order sizes exactly needs to be bunched.  
 
Example: Assume there are seven buyer types, 
1 7,...,h h , and in the optimal the contracts 
2 3 4A A A
 
  and 6 7A A
  will be bunched. The initialization yields 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7q q q q q q q!   ! !  . In the outer loop, the first bunching region (starting from 2A ) is 
identified, while the the inner loop determines that three contracts, namely 2 3 4A A A
 
  need to 
be bunched. Afterwards, the outer loop identifies the second bunching region (starting from 
6A ) 
while the inner loop identifies that the contracts 6 7A A
  are being bunched. It thus follows 
, -11 24 55 67, , ,M q q q q 
  which translates to the variables 
, -11 24 55 67 1 0 11,24,55,67ijx x x x and x ij
 
 
 
 
   .  
4. Performance benchmarks and numerical example 
In order to assess the impact of the buyer’s insensitivity to small pay-off differences, we compare 
the behavioral robust contract (br) to the a-priori screening contract with and without self-selection. 
The benchmark of the a-priori contract with self-selection (as) depicts the classical situation in which 
all buyers are strictly profit maximizing, while the a-priori contract with insensitivity to small pay-off 
differences (ai) depicts the situation in which the buyer is in fact not strictly profit maximizing but the 
supplier nonetheless offers the a-priori screening contract. Table 1 summarizes the assumptions 
underlying the respective benchmarks.  The supply chain performance is measured as the 
performance gap (coordination deficit, CD) between the expected supply chain costs in the 
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respective benchmarks, i.e., , -( ), , ,iSCE C i as ai br "  and the expected supply chain costs in a 
centralized setting (supply chain optimum), ( )SCSCE C : Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
 , -( ) ( ) , ,i i SCSC SCCD E C E C i as ai br
   "  (4.1) 
Table 1: Performance benchmarks 
 Screening contract based on 
a-priori probabilities expected frequency 
of contract choices  
Strict profit maximization: 1 
  as  
Near profit maximization: 0 1   ai br 
 
Supply Chain Performance: An upper bound for the expected coordination deficit is aiCD , i.e., 
the coordination deficit that results if the a-priori screening contract is offered, but not all buyers are 
strictly profit maximizing, i.e., there is a certain probability  1  that the supplier is interacting 
with a buyer who is insensitive to small pay-off differences. Obviously, accounting for the 
insensitivity to small pay-off differences can only improve the supply chain performance, since it is 
anticipated that indifferences contract might occur. This, in turn, shifts the probability mass towards 
higher holding costs levels which also increases order sizes. Interestingly, though, the expected 
coordination deficit asCD is not a lower bound for the coordination deficit. The reason is that the 
shift of probability mass from lower types hi to higher types hj, j > i, tends to increase the order sizes 
qj, which has a positive effect on the supply chain performance for the types hj. If this positive effect 
is not offset by the buyer choosing with probability  1 i the order size qj instead of qi  j iq q  , 
then the supply chain performance can even improve compared to the classical case. An example in 
which supply chain performance improves compared to the classical screening model with self-
selection is shown in Section 5, Figure 4b.  
Supplier’s performance:  The supplier’s expected profits are obviously largest in the classical 
benchmark with self-selection and lowest in the classical benchmark with indifference contract 
choices.6 However, the anticipation of indifference contract choices and the respective offering of 
behaviorally optimized contracts dampen the impact of indifference contract choices. Hence, the 
following relation for the supplier’s expected profits holds:      .ai br asS S SE P E P E P   
                                                          
6
If the supplier could increase self-selection without any costs – as in the classical screening benchmark –
then his profits would increase. 
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Buyer’s costs: The buyer’s costs can only decrease due to indifference contract choices 
compared to the classical screening benchmark. Obviously, the indifference contract choice has only 
an arbitrarily small impact on the buyer’s performance. However, since the supplier tends to adjust 
the order sizes of higher types upwards, the informational rents of the lower types increase. Overall, 
thus, the expected costs decrease since the effect of increased informational rents is only marginally 
mitigated by arbitrarily small costs caused by indifference contract choices.  
The following numerical example depicts a situation with three buyer types (h1, h2, h3).7 It is 
assumed that the buyer’s insensitivity to small pay-off differences can be described by the following 
function,  , that is linear in , 0i i ht t t   given that the buyer acts with probability   strictly profit 
maximizing:  ( ) 1 1 i hi
h
t tt
t
  
     (see Figure 1). 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Pay-off insensitivity of buyers 
Table 1 presents the parameters for the baseline example without bunching. Note, that the costs 
of the outside option, R, are set such that the supplier always yields higher profits than compared to 
the outside option. Trade with all buyers is always profitable if trade is profitable with the highest 
type, i.e.,  
 n S
n
fw d P
q
 
  	 
 
. (4.2) 
Replacing nw with its optimal value (3.4) in (4.2) and replacing nq with the highest value that can 
result, i.e., the supply chain optimal quantity FInq , and the highest possible additional incentive, ht , 
                                                          
7 In order to investigate the propensity of bunching that is caused by the insensitivity to small pay-off 
differences, the numerical example is based on three buyer types, since bunching will never occur in the two-
type case. The following presents a numerical baseline example for the case with and without bunching. For a 
discussion that two distinctive types are not sufficient for analyzing all effects in screening models see 
Kerschbamer and Maderner, 1998). 

1
lt ht
it
( )it
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gives a value for R allowing the supplier to make profits even when trading with the high cost buyer: 
 / / 2 cSC SCS n h n nR P f q t h d q
      , where c defines the supplier’s level of profits. Note, the 
difference between c and SP is that higher SP  might exclude buyers from trade (see, e.g., Ha (2001) 
and Cakanyildirim et al. (2012)), while a higher level of c translates to the buyer having higher costs 
of sourcing from an alternative supplier. Thus, the higher the costs of the buyer’s outside option, the 
higher the wholesale-price the supplier may claim.  
Moreover, it may be difficult to assess in a practical situation the buyers insensitivity to small pay 
off differences, i.e., to assess the form of i . As an approximation we assume that the highest 
required additional incentive can be obtained by the cost difference between the contract choices 
A1/A2 and A3 in the classical a-priori screening contract, since the experimental results from 
Inderfurth et al. (2012) indicate that this profit difference is large enough for incentivizing the 
respective (nearly) profit maximizing contract choice.  
 Table 2: Parameter values in numerical example for the case without bunching  
Parameter 
 
   , 800,100f d 

   1 2 3, , 0.3,0.4,0.3p p p 

 1 2 3, , (1,3,5)h h h 
  
 
 , (0.6,0.5)ht  
 1 
   , , 0,15,5SP R c 
 2 
1)       2 1 2 3/ 2 as asht h h d q q 
    
2)  3 3 3/ / 2 cSC SCS hR P f q t h d q
       
 
For the given parameter values, Table 3 summarizes the optimal contract parameters/decision 
variables and Table 4 summarizes the cost effects for the supplier/buyer/supply chain given the 
respective contract choices Ai and types hi, i=1,2,3.  
The coordination deficits are 20.42asCD 
 (i.e., 3.07 % of optimal SC costs), 28.45brCD 
 (i.e., 
4.28 % of optimal SC costs), and 59.75aiCD 
 (i.e. 8.98 % of optimal SC costs). Hence, if the classical 
screening approach is taken without considering the insensitivity to small pay-off differences, then 
the performance gap is approximately three times as large as predicted by the classical screening 
theory (a large impact on supply chain performance was also observed by Inderfurth et al., 2012). 
However, the performance losses resulting from indifference contract choices can be substantially 
limited with a behavioral robust contract where the cost increase is only 40% compared to the 
classical screening benchmark without indifference contract choices. 
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Table 3: Optimal contract parameters/decision variables for the case without bunching 
Contract offer Order size Wholesale 
Price 
Additional 
incentive 
Supply Chain Optimal 
order size 
A1 = <q1, w1> q1= 400.00 w1= 8.72 t1= 0.35 q1SC=400.00 
A2 = <q2, w2> q2= 182.58 w2= 10.15 t2= 0 q2SC =230.94 
A3 = <q3, w3> q3= 151.19 w3= 10.62 t3= 0.60 q3SC =178.89 
Table 4: Cost/profit effect in dependence of contract choice and holding cost realization for the case without 
bunching
 A1 A2 A3 
Alternative 
option 
Expected 
profits/cost 
Supplier’s profit 671.51 576.78 532.89 0 577.27 
  
 
Buyer’s costs 
h1 1071.51 1106.23 1137.63 1500.00 
1271.17 h2 1471.51 1288.81 1288.81 1500.00 
h3 1871.51 1471.40 1440.00 1500.00 
  
 
Supply chain costs 
h1 400.00 529,45 604.74 907.11 
693.91 h2 800.00 712.03 755.93 907.11 
h3 1200.00 894.61 907.11 907.11 
 
Bunching: An example in which there is no bunching in the a-priori screening contract, but 
bunching in the behavioral robust contract can be easily constructed from the example by setting 
0.1 
 . Obviously, a change in  does not impact the classical a-priori screening contract since 
such a parameter does not exist in this model. However, by changing   the marginal benefits of 
increasing it increase, since a larger fraction of buyers is incentivized choosing the self-selection 
contract. If all other parameter values from Table 2 remain the same then the following optimal 
decision variables (Table 5) and profits/costs (Table 6) result:  
Table 5: Optimal contract parameters/decision variables for the case with bunching 
Contract offer Order size Wholesale 
Price 
Additional 
incentive 
A1 = <q1, w1> q1= 400.00 w1= 8.71 t1= 0.6 
A2 = <q2, w2> q2= 154.37 w2= 10.54 t2= 0 
A3 = <q3, w3> q3= 154.37 w3= 10.54 t3= 0.60
 
Bunching of  
contracts
A2 and A3 
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Table 6: Cost/profit effect in dependence of contract choice and holding cost realization for the case with bunching 
 A1 A2=A3 
Alternative 
option 
Expected 
profits/cost 
Supplier’s profit 671,26 535,84 0 576,47 
 
 
Buyer’s costs 
h1 1071,26 1131,26 1500 
1267,63 h2 1471,26 1285,63 1500 
h3 1871,26 1440,00 1500 
 
 
Supply chain costs 
h1 400,00 595,42 904,16 
691,17 h2 800,00 749,79 904,16 
h3 1200,00 904,16 904,16 
The coordination deficits for the classical screening approach remains at the same level, i.e., 
20.42asCD 
 (i.e., 4.28 % of optimal SC costs), however, the adjusted coordination gap for the 
behavioral robust contract reduces to 25.71brCD 
 (i.e., 3.86 % of optimal SC costs), caused by an 
upward adjustment of the order size 3q . In turn, the coordination deficit for the classical screening 
model with indifference contract choices increases substantially to 91.2aiCD 
 (i.e. 13.71 % of 
optimal SC costs). This significant increase is obviously driven by the fact that the frequency of 
indifference contract choices increases which is not anticipated in the benchmark ai, i.e., buyer type 
ih chooses with the probability  1 i the even more downwards distorted order size 1iq  .   
The following Section 5 presents a sensitivity analysis, in order to gain some deeper insight on 
the impact of the specific parameter values on the coordination deficit. 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
In the following we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the above baseline example. We 
concentrate on the coordination deficits in percent of the optimal supply chain costs, since they 
indicate under which situations the supply chain performance is especially vulnerable if buyers are 
insensitive to small pay-off differences.  Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
The coordination deficit in percent of optimal supply chain costs is relatively insensitive to 
parameter changes of the fixed costs, f, and the demand rate, d. For low values of f and d, the 
relative attractiveness of the supplier’s outside option, SP , decreases and, thus, the supplier may 
increase the additional incentive and, therefore, 3( )t . However, for all changes of f and d, 1( )t  
and 2( )t remain constant.  
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Figure 2: Coordination deficit in % of SC optimal costs in dependence of fixed costs f 
When changing the a-priori probability distribution the impact of bunching on supply chain 
performance becomes obvious. The following Figure 3 depicts the benchmark in dependence of p2, 
where  1 3 21 / 2p p p
 
  . 
 
Figure 3: Coordination deficit in % of SC optimal costs in dependence of a-priori probability p2 
For p2 < 0.33, we observe bunching of the order sizes q2 and q3  for the behavioral robust 
contract, since it is not optimal for the supplier to design a distinctive contract for buyer type h2, 
because the informational rent induced for buyer type h1 would be too high. In turn, bunching occurs 
for the a-priori contracts only for p2 < 0.18, highlighting that considering bunching in contract design 
becomes much more important when there is not a one to one mapping between a-priori 
distribution and frequency of contract choices. Interestingly, the impact on the coordination deficit 
of bunching is much higher in the classical setting. A closer look on Figure 3 reveals that in the a-
priori contract settings, the coordination deficit is on a lower level when bunching occurs. However, 
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such a significant effect is not observable in the behavioral contract setting, because in those 
parameter regions where the contracts A2 and A3 are very similar (i.e., there is almost bunching), it is 
not optimal for the supplier to additionally incentivize the insensitive buyers by increasing t2. Thus, 
with probability (1 )  the contract A3 will still be chosen and the effect of bunching on the 
coordination deficit is therefore smoothened.  
The degree of uncertainty is also impacted by the distance between the holding cost realizations. 
Let a define the distance between the holding cost realizations, i.e., h1 = 1, h2=h1+a, and h3=h2 +a. 
The larger the distance between the holding cost realizations, the higher the informational rents the 
buyer is receiving and, therefore, the higher efficiency losses caused by asymmetrically distributed 
information. Figure 4a Figure 4b depict the coordination deficits in dependence of a. The non-
monotonicity for values around a = 2.3 is due to the supplier reducing the additional incentive for not 
choosing the alternative supplier, i.e., t3. Obviously, the higher h3, the lower the profits the supplier 
may extract from the buyer and, thus, the higher the willingness to let him choose the alternative 
supplier. Interestingly, for 0.2a  the coordination deficit brCD is even lower than in the a-priori 
screening contract under self-selection assumption, i.e., asCD , highlighting that asCD cannot be 
generally regarded as a lower bound for the expected supply chain deficit (see Figure 4b). As 
mentioned before, this is due to the fact that the shift of probability mass increases order sizes for 
higher cost types and this positive effect is not offset by choosing the indifference contract.  
  
Figure 4a: Coordination deficit in % of SC optimal costs in dependence of distance between holding cost realizations 
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Figure 4b: Coordination deficit in % of SC optimal costs in dependence of distance between holding cost realizations 
Finally, we show the impact of the fraction of buyers who are sensitive to small pay-off 
differences, i.e.,   (see Figure 5). For low  , the benefits of increasing the pay-off difference it  
becomes relatively larger, since 0i h
h l
t t
t t




  

, i.e., the larger   the flatter the slope of ( )it
and vice versa.  
Thus, for small values of  one might expect that it is profitable setting i ht t i
  ,i.e., the 
classical assumption of all buyers being profit maximizing is resembled. However, the numerical 
highlights, that the classical benchmark under the profit-maximization assumption will not be 
reached, since bunching occurs for 0.4   resulting in a coordination deficit compared to the 
classical a-priori screening contract with self-selection (as). Hence, even though incentivizing self-
selection is relatively cheap, the classical benchmark will not be achieved, because the additional 
incentives required for self-selection increase the buyer type’s h1 informational rent and, thus, the 
benefits of bunching increase which is an additional source of supply chain inefficiency. Yet, once 
bunching is just not anymore optimal, brCD is decreases which holds for 0.4 0.46  .
However, since the marginal cost for incentivizing the buyer’s self-selection are increasing with 
 , the coordination deficit is increasing in our example for 0.46 0.68.  In these cases, the 
supplier reduces the incentive for self-selection, it , which is not offset by the probability that the 
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buyer is profit maximizing. Thus, in this region the probability of self-selection ( , )it   tends to 
decrease which is caused by lower values it .  
Yet, for 0.68 ! the coordination deficit is decreasing, since the lower willingness to incentivize 
self-selection is offset by the higher probability   that is independent from it , i.e. ( , )it   is 
increasing. Note, that 1 
 resembles the classical assumption within screening theory and, 
therefore, all benchmarks fall together for this specific case.   
 
Figure 5: Coordination deficit in % of SC optimal costs in dependence of buyers sensitive to small pay-off differences  
6. Conclusion and Managerial Insights 
Formelabschnitt (nä chster ) 
There is a growing body of work analyzing the inefficiencies of supply chain interactions under 
asymmetric information in common principal-agent settings. Traditionally, it is assumed that the 
agent (here: buyer) is strictly profit-maximizing.  However, recent experimental work in the 
behavioral operations management area highlights that the strict profit maximization assumption is 
critical since buyers tend to be insensitive to small pay-off differences and, therefore, choose 
between strictly profit maximizing and only nearly profit maximizing contracts. Yet, such only nearly 
profit maximizing contracts have a substantially negative impact on the supplier’s and overall supply 
chain’s pay-offs, while the impact on the buyer’s pay-offs is obviously negligible. 
 
The present work relaxes the critical profit maximization assumption by assuming that the buyer 
in a serial supplier-buyer supply chain is only nearly profit maximizing, i.e., for sufficiently low pay-off 
differences between two contract alternatives the buyer will choose with a certain probability the 
-1%
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
15%
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9
Co
or
di
na
tio
n 
de
fic
it 
in
 
pe
rc
en
t o
f o
pt
im
al
 S
C 
co
st
s 
alpha_quer 
br
as
ai
 24 Voigt: Contracting under asymmetric information for nearly profit maximizing buyers
profit maximizing contract and with the complementary probability the only nearly profit maximizing 
contract. We show that the supplier can account for such behavior by increasing the pay-off 
differences between the contract alternatives and/or by adjusting the order sizes in the respective 
menu of contracts. Therefore, we introduce a slack variable into the buyer’s binding incentive 
constraints that allows the supplier to control for the pay-off differences between the contracts 
alternatives and, therefore, to influence the probabilities with which the respective contracts are 
chosen (see also Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  
First, the analysis reveals that the second best benchmark that is predicted by the classical 
screening theory substantially overestimates the actual supply chain performance, since the nearly 
profit maximizing buyer will not choose the already downwards distorted profit maximizing order 
size, but sometimes the even more downwards distorted order size that is only nearly profit 
maximizing. However, if the supplier accounts for this behavior by designing a behavioral robust 
contract that accounts for insensitivity to small pay-off differences, then the performance losses can 
be substantially limited. Since the performance losses are mainly born by the supplier (note, the 
buyer is at least nearly profit maximizing), the supplier obviously has an incentive to anticipate such 
behavior and adjust the contract parameters accordingly. Nonetheless, we conclude that the 
inefficiencies arising from asymmetrically distributed information are underestimated in the 
coordination literature and along with this the benefits of cooperation (truthful information sharing 
and trusting information processing).  
Second, the present work shows how to deal from an Operations Research point of view with the 
difficulties arising from incorporating insensitivity to small pay-off differences into a stylized lotsizing 
model that depicts the well-known conflict that suppliers typically favor large order sizes while 
buyers favor to order in smaller lots (e.g., just in time mode). It is shown that the resulting 
optimization problem loses its favorable concavity property. However, it is proven for the case of a 
linear dependency between the additional incentive and the probability of self-selection that there 
are at most two critical points, whereas one critical point qualifies for an optimal solution. Thus, 
standard approaches for solving non-linear equation systems can be used for determining the critical 
points which allows for example practitioners to solve the evolving problems with standard software.  
Third, closely related to the issue of determining the optimal contract parameters, it is shown 
that under the behavioral robust contract it is in more instances optimal offering the same contract 
to several buyer types (i.e., bunching) than in the classical screening theory which is an additional 
source of inefficiencies in supply chain management. Yet, in most contributions regarding 
asymmetric information the optimality of bunching is ruled out by limiting the number of types 
and/or restricting the a-priori distribution of types. Yet, such restrictions that are generally accepted 
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within the screening literature are not applicable in the present context, since there is not a one-to-
one mapping of the a-priori distribution to the frequency of contract choices. Hence, we are 
presenting an algorithm that allows identifying the relevant bunching areas for an unlimited number 
of discretely distributed types.  
From a supply chain manager's perspective, our findings imply that relying on indifference-based 
equilibrium models (e.g., screening contracts) can seriously harm the supply chain performance, 
since managers cannot assume that their business partners will generally take the profit-maximizing 
action, when the pay-off differences to the next best alternatives are very small. Thus, for the 
manager it seems worthwhile to investigate how a varying the size of the incentives in screening 
contracts affects the frequency of buyer's deviation from the equilibrium choice.  
Finally, the present study is subject to some limitations and may be extended in several ways. 
First, we are restricting ourselves to nearly profit maximizing buyers and a linear dependency 
between the additional incentive and the probability of self-selection. However, if a certain 
sensitivity to pay-off differences is not satisfied, then not even the indifference contract may be 
chosen. Possible ways to model such situations are presented e.g. by Basov (2009) and Basov and 
Danilkina (2006), who are assuming that the agents are following a probabilistic choice rule in which 
every type chooses each contract with positive probability. Second, we are assuming that it is never 
profitable for the buyer to exclude buyers from trade (so-called cut-off policy). However, we 
conjecture that the main insights remain valid in such settings, since excluding buyers will typically 
only be a local phenomenon (i.e., if all buyers are excluded from trade, then the problem becomes 
trivial). Third, we motivate that near profit maximization results from the buyers making small 
decision errors, e.g., when calculating their profits. However, it may also be worthwhile investigating 
how fairness or reciprocity concerns (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000)) impact the buyers contract choices. In such cases, the buyers tendency towards contracts 
with small pay-off differences might be driven by the intention to punish the supplier for perceived 
unfair behavior, e.g., leaving only the reservation profit for the high cost type.  
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Inserting (8.17) and (8.19) into (8.3) and (8.2) gives  
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If the implementability condition is not binding in the optimal menu of contracts, then 0ij 
 and 
the optimal order sizes result from  
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Yet, if bunching occurs in the optimal menu of contracts, then at least one , 0i j ! . We define ijq as 
the order sizes that are bunched, i.e., 1 ...ij i i jq q q q j i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Inserting (8.19) and rearranging gives 
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Given the optimal contract parameters that can be determined via the algorithm stated in Section 3, 
the optimal wholesale prices result from (8.9) 
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As long as the additional incentive is an interior solution (i.e.,  as long as  , 0i i  
 ), the optimal 
value for it  can be obtained by solving the equation system resulting from inserting (8.19) into (8.6), 
i.e.,  
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And for inserting (8.24) and (8.25) gives il  which denotes the marginal revenues/costs of increasing 
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Respectively, nt can be obtained by inserting (8.17) into (8.7) 
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Note, that the equations (8.26)/(8.27) are uni-modular and have therefore at most two roots.  
Proof:  
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Let the first term,  
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denote the effect of changing it if the order sizes are not adjusted (e.g., the order sizes are calculated 
with  
 ), where 1 2il x x
  . (8.30) is constant and negative, i.e.,  (8.27) would be strictly 
monotonically decreasing if the order sizes were not adjusted. However, in the optimal solution, the 
order sizes iq and 1iq   will only be adjusted, if the marginal revenues of increasing the order size are 
larger than the marginal cost. Thus, it follows that adjusting the order sizes can only have a positive 
contribution in (8.27) and it follows that there can be at most one maximum.  
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Let 
2x  denote the effect of the order size adjustment, i.e.,  
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The effect of the order size adjustment is positive (which follows directly from  
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) and this positive effect becomes larger with increasing it which 
follows directly from (8.31).  Thus, it follows that (8.27) is unimodular (a monotonically increasing 
positive term, (8.31), is added to a constant negative term, (8.30), and thus there are at most two 
roots for each equation in (8.29) satisfying the necessary KKT conditions. If there are two roots, then 
the first necessary condition is a local maximum (the marginal revenues of increasing it  are larger 
than the marginal costs), and the second root is necessarily a local minimum. The following  
Figure 6 depicts the case with two roots (y1 and y2). For ti < y1 the marginal revenues (i.e., 
incentivizing choosing a larger order size) are larger than the marginal costs (i.e., the informational 
rent to the buyer). Thus, for a local maximum the supplier should increase ti to y1. For y1<ti<y2, the 
marginal costs are higher than the marginal benefits, and increasing ti to y2 will yield a local 
maximium. Increasing ti  further contributes positively to the objective function. Thus, if the 
additional benefits gained by increasing ti from y2 to th offset the cost occurred from increasing ti 
from y1 to y2, then the global optimum will be th, otherwise it will be y1.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Critical points resulting from the KKT conditions 
ti 
marginal revenues > marginal costs 
th tl 
li 
y1 y2 
marginal revenues < marginal costs 
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Let y1 denote a root for which  
 1 2( ) 0 and ( ) 0i il y l y. . !    (8.32) 
then:  
/ y1 is the global maximum if y2 does not exist 
/ y1 or th are the global maximum if y2 exist 
/ tl or th are the global maximum if only y2 exist 
Thus, for solving the non-linear equation system, a simple local search procedure can be applied, and 
the above conditions needs to be tested for identifying the optimal solution.  
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